Declaratory Judgment a Needed Procedural Reform

It is now our purpose to undertake an analysis of numerous declaratory actions and judgments, with a view to determine the scope of and the limitations upon this useful form of procedure. An examination of declaratory judgments in the various jurisdictions in which the institution has been adopted reveals a remarkable similarity of fundamental principles characterizing the practice of making judicial declarations. As our interest is confined to the practice, emphasis will be laid not upon the- decision itself as a matter of substantive law, but rather upon the type of question submitted for declaratory judgment, the cases in which such judgments are rendered, and the limitations placed by the courts upon the exercise of the power to make declarations of rights and of other jural relations

Book Review: History of Germanic Private Law

The opinion expressed some years ago on the appearance of the first volume of this notable series, namely, that the horizon of the lawyer trained in the common law would be vastly broadened by these English translations of fundamental works on continental legal history, is amply fortified by the volume under review

Recent Developments in International and Municipal Law

The charge has frequently been heard in the last few years that international law is in a state of suspended animation and paralytic desuetude. Those who have embraced the view that it is not law at all find in the experiences of the last three years what they consider unanswerable support. To the uninformed, these criticisms of international law as a system make a striking appeal. Yet, when exam­ined in the light of fact and history it will be discovered that the criticism, even in its widest application, can extend only to a very limited portion of the rules governing the conduct of war, and that the great body of the so-called law of nations is constantly enforced in international practice and in courts of law

Book Review: The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage

This is an excellent monograph, well organized and balanced, on a so-called doctrine of international law which enables a belligerent to seize neutral ships or goods for violation of (a) trades for­ bidden to neutrals, (b) restrictions on the carriage of contraband, or (c) blockade, even though the ship or cargo is not directly destined for a belligerent port. It is a comparatively modern doctrine, not known before the eighteenth century. So important is it, that the legal system involved in the compromise between belligerent and neutral rights, known as international maritime law, may be destroyed if the doctrine is not strictly limited to its historical and consensual scope

Book Review: Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law

In this useful series the authors and editor undertake to present the development of the law and practice of neutrality since about the sixteenth century, as exemplified in treaties and the practice of nations and prize courts. The first volume, dealing mainly with the seventeenth century but to some extent with the sixteenth and eighteenth, has brought together the contributions of treaties, court decisions and the views of early writers on contraband, blockade, enemy property, procedure and prize court practice and neutral duties.It is important for it shows that the historic struggle between belligerent and neutral claims-the belligerent to prevent trade with his enemy, the neutral to continue and trade-eventuated in a compromise by which the neutral forgoes distinctly military aid to the enemy and the belligerent must permit non-military trade. Around this principle rules have been worked out, set forth succinctly by Mr. Jessup in the Preface to volume 3

Government Liability In Tort

Probably no function of a municipal corporation is more “governmental in character than the care of its highways, streets and bridges. In theory, therefore, the city should be immune from responsibility for negligence in such matters; and such was the common law. Precisely the opposite result, however, constitutes the weight of judicial authority in this country, even in the absence of statue, on the commonly advanced ground that the duty of taking care of the public highways is ministerial in character. The conclusion deserves approval, though not necessarily the ground on which it is based. More difficult to support is the common-law immunity extended to towns and countries in several parts of the country in respect of like defects in public highways. Mention has already been made of the way in which the courts, first in New England, worked out the immunity of the country, on the authority of Russell v. Men of Devon. Most of these cases involved acti.ons for injuries arising out of defective highways or bridges

An Indiana Declaratory Judgment

It is an aphorism that the greatest enemies of law reform, and particularly of procedural reform, are the lawyers. A striking exemplification of the axiom may be found in Brindley v. Meara, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana, November 18, 1935, 198 N. E. 301. That was the second of two appearances before the Supreme Court of the members of the advisory board of North Township, Lake County. They had already successfully brought an action for a declaratory judgment, construing a statute which determined that they and not the defendant, township trustee, had the power to select the persons that shall be employed by the trustee as investigators or assistants in discharging duties concerning the relief of the poor. 194 N. E. 351. Later on, the trustee apparently annoyed the advisory board by publishing certain articles attacking their integrity and impartiality, and threatened to hamper and harass the board in the performance of their duties. They then petitioned the court a second time as further relief for an order enjoining the trustee from interfering [with] harassing and annoying your petitioners